This week, the en banc Federal Circuit issued an opinion in In re Tam, No. 14-1203 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 22, 2015), holding that the relevant portion of Section 2(a) of the Trademark Act barring the patent office from registering scandalous, immoral or disparaging marks was an unconstitutional infringement of the First Amendment. The Federal Circuit's decision has significant implications for another trademark case pending in the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, wherein the Washington Redskins seek to overturn the Patent and Trademark Office's cancellation of the "Redskins" trademark on the same grounds. Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, No. 15-1874 (4th Cir. filed Aug. 6, 2015). But what does this decision mean for design patent law, which retains the authority to refuse to issue patents covering ornamental designs deemed "offensive to any race, religion, sex, ethnic group or nationality?" Find out after the jump.
Showing posts with label Federal Circuit. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Federal Circuit. Show all posts
Wednesday, December 23, 2015
Tuesday, December 15, 2015
Samsung Appeals to the Supreme Court! ... (but probably won't get there)
It's not every day that the New York Times reports on design patent news. But when it does, it usually has something to do with smartphones.
The big news in design patent law today is Samsung's inevitable appeal to the Supreme Court from its August loss (mostly) at the Federal Circuit. Just last week, Apple and Samsung appeared to finally be putting this lawsuit behind them, when it was announced that Samsung had agreed to pay Apple $548,176,477 to satisfy the judgment entered by Judge Koh and affirmed by the Federal Circuit. However, in the agreement, Samsung had reserved its right to "reimbursement" if the judgment is reversed.
In its petition for writ of certiorari, Samsung points out two alleged errors by the Federal Circuit - 1) whether the Federal Circuit should have "factored out" the allegedly functional aspects of Apple's design patents, and 2) whether the Federal Circuit erred by not apportioning Samsung's profits between the profits attributable to the infringing design and the profits resulting from other aspects of the infringing products.
Of course, Samsung worded the questions presented somewhat differently:
The questions presented are:
1. Where a design patent includes unprotected non-ornamental features, should a district court be required to limit that patent to its protected ornamental scope?
2. Where a design patent is applied to only a component of a product, should an award of infringer’s profits be limited to those profits attributable to the component?
Regardless of how Samsung chooses to articulate the issues, however, a Supreme Court hearing seems unlikely, in the opinion of this author.
With respect to the first issue, the Federal Circuit did an excellent job of clarifying its own, somewhat confusing precedent from cases like Richardson v. Stanley Works. In Apple v. Samsung, the court explained that that the functional aspect of a claim may be conceptually factored out as part of claim construction without literally "exclud[ing] those components in their entirety." See our earlier post on this topic here. This pronouncement of the law will help simplify design patent claim construction, while emphasizing to juries and judges that designs do not protect functional concepts, only the appearance of an article of manufacture.
With respect to the third issue, it is highly unlikely that the Supreme Court would attempt to blatantly overrule the clear, expressed wishes of Congress. Samsung seems to argue that § 289 is just "really old." But it's unclear why the Supreme Court's analysis of this argument would be any different from the Federal Circuit's:
In reciting that an infringer “shall be liable to the owner to the extent of [the infringer’s] total profit,” Section 289 explicitly authorizes the award of total profit from the article of manufacture bearing the patented design. Several other courts also concluded that Section 289 authorizes such award of total profit. ... The clear statutory language prevents us from adopting a “causation” rule as Samsung urges.
So while its exciting to see design patents in the news, don't hold your breath for the first Supreme Court design patent case in 100+ years. Of course, we could be wrong and, if we are, we will be the first to celebrate.
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Wednesday, August 27, 2014
Pacific Coast v. Malibu Boats - The Nightmare Apportionment Scenario Realized
Last Friday we commented on Professor Lemley's amicus brief in the Apple v. Samsung case, which addresses the issue of apportionment in design patent law. Apparently, Judge John Antoon II of the Middle District of Florida was working on his own "post" on design patent apportionment at the same time. Last Friday, Judge Antoon issued a decision denying Malibu's motions for summary judgment, including a motion to limit potential damages to the profits for the accused windshields in the case of Pacific Coast Marine Windshields, Ltd. v. Malibu Boats, LLC. As a result of Judge Antoon's decision Malibu's total profits for the sale of its speedboats will be at risk if they are found to have infringed Pacific Coast's design patent on a boat windshield.
Here's a graphic to help explain the decision:
You might recall this case from its previous trip to the Federal Circuit, where the court reversed Judge Antoon's decision to apply prosecution history estoppel to limit Pacific Coast's claims against Malibu. While the Federal Circuit held that prosecution history estoppel applies to design patent, the court reversed the district court’s summary judgment of non-infringement because it found that the accused design was not within the scope of the subject matter surrendered during prosecution.
It is unclear why Malibu Boats did not renew its motion for summary judgment on remand. Although its prosecution history estoppel argument had been defeated, it still had strong non-infringement arguments as a result of the Federal Circuit's decision. For example, if, as the Federal Circuit says, the accused windshield was not within the scope of the canceled figure, then how could the accused windshield be within the scope of the remaining figures of the '070 Patent? The accused design appears to be more similar to the cancelled figure than the asserted design, and that fact might have been enough for Judge Antoon to grant summary judgment.
Malibu's decision not to renew its motion for summary judgment on non-infringement may cost them. Judge Antoon's decision on Friday was a simple matter of statutory interpretation. The court found that its hands were tied in light of the statutory history of § 289:
Congress removed the apportionment requirement in
1887, with the enactment of what later became§ 289. [See Nike.
Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores. Inc., 138 F.3d 1437, 1441 (Fed. Cir. 1998)]. Design
patent owners are no longer required “to apportion the infringer's profits
between the patented design and the article bearing the design.” Id. at 1442. The intent of Congress to allow more expansive
recovery for design patent owners is exhibited in the plain language of the
statute, which allows recovery of "total profit" from anyone who
sells “any article of manufacture to which such design or colorable imitation
has been applied.” 35 U.S.C. § 289. In
this case, Malibu sells boats, to which patented windshields have been applied.
The plain language and intent of the statute support a conclusion that Pacific
is entitled to Malibu's profits from the sale of its boats with the windshield.
This reading of § 289 is further supported by Federal
Circuit and district court decisions. In Nike,
the Federal Circuit referred to the damages as profits from "the infringing
shoes" when the patent involved only part of the shoe. 138 F .3d at 144 7.
In Apple. Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co.,
the plaintiff had several patents pertaining to smartphones and tablet
computers that claimed a portion of the design of particular electronic devices
but disclaimed other portions. 678 F.3d 1314, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2012). With
respect to damages based on the defendant's profits, the district court ruled
that the plaintiff was not required to prove which portions of the profits were
earned by the design feature. Apple. Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 926 F. Supp.
2d 1100, 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2013). "Congress specifically drafted the design
patent remedy provisions to remove an apportionment requirement that the
Supreme Court had imposed. Thus, there is simply no apportionment requirement
for infringer's profits in design patent infringement under § 289." Id.
While Judge Antoon's legal analysis is correct, the case of Pacific Coast v. Malibu Boats is a striking example of the sometimes inequitable result of § 289 in the absence of any equitable discretion in the hands of the Court. Malibu's boats sell for anywhere between $50,000 and nearly $100,000, while the accused windshields cannot possibly cost more than a few hundred dollars, standing alone. This is precisely the type of inequitable scenario that Professor Lemley highlighted in his amicus brief and is the type of situation that the Federal Circuit must grapple with in the appeal from the Apple v. Samsung case.
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Friday, August 22, 2014
Design Patent Apportionment - The Answer Lies in Copyright Law
On Thanksgiving last year, we wrote about the apportionment problem in design patent cases by analogizing to a thanksgiving favorite, turducken. The apportionment problem deals with how courts should award "total profits" for design patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 289 when the infringing design is only one of many profitable features in the infringing product. For example, in the Apple v. Samsung case (now on appeal), Samsung maintains that its accused Galaxy devices were profitable, at least in part, because of their functionality and software, not just Apple’s patented designs which it was found to have infringed.As promised, the issue of design patent apportionment has reared its ugly head in Samsung's appeal to the Federal Circuit in the Apple v. Samsung case. I recently had an opportunity to read the "Brief Amici Curiae of 27 Law Professors In Support of Appellant Samsung," which is available on the AIPLA web page for the industrial design committee. I found Professor Lemley's brief to be well reasoned and persuasive and I think the Federal Circuit will have some tough decisions to make when it comes to the apportionment issue. Two things in the Amicus Brief jumped out at me and my take on the apportionment problem differs only slightly from Professor Lemley's.
First, as professor Lemley appears to concede, the statutory history relating to § 289 is not easily ignored. Congress specifically removed the apportionment requirement from the disgorgement remedy in response to a Supreme Court case that applied apportionment in such a way that it basically declawed the disgorgement remedy. In Dobson v. Carpet Co., 114 U.S. 439 (1885), the Supreme Court held that a design patent plaintiff must be required to establish the profits attributable to the infringing design and, because there was no evidence the patented designs at issue had contributed to the profits of the infringing carpets, the Supreme Court reversed and awarded only nominal damages. See id. Congress then passed the statute of 1887 in response to the Dobson decision. "The manifest purpose of congress was to enlarge the remedy against infringers of design patents, and to declare that the measure of profits recoverable on account of the infringement should be considered to be the total net profits upon the whole article." Untermeyer v. Freund, 58 F. 205 (2d Cir. 1893) (emphasis added); see also Nike, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437, 1441 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“The Act of 1887, specific to design patents, removed the apportionment requirement when recovery of the infringer’s profit was sought….”). This clear statutory history and legislative intent will be difficult for Samsung to overcome and nearly impossible for the Federal Circuit to ignore.
While I agree that "awarding a defendant’s entire profits makes no sense in the modern world," the same could be said of the minimum $250 remedy that is also available under § 289. In the modern world, a design patent holder will spend more in a single billable hour of design patent litigation than it could ever hope to recoup under this provision. Yet, federal courts are incompetent to update § 289 so as to increase this minimum monetary award to a more modern amount. Courts are equally incompetent to read apportionment back into § 289 after Congress deliberately removed it.
Second, the Amicus Brief notes that the "closest analogue" for the disgorgement remedy in § 289 is found in the remedies for trademark infringement. On this point, I would disagree. The disgorgement remedy in design patent cases is a close cousin of the disgorgement remedy under copyright law. See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 399 (1940) ("Prior to the Copyright Act of 1909..., there had been no statutory provision for the recovery of profits, but that recovery had been allowed in equity both in copyright and patent cases as appropriate equitable relief incident to a decree for an injunction."); Braun Inc. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 975 F. 2d 815, 824 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("R]ecovery of an infringer's profits evolved in courts of equity"). Indeed, § 504 of the Copyright Act still uses language that is virtually identical to the disgorgement remedy in design patent law prior to Congress's decision to remove apportionment. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) ("The copyright owner is entitled to recover ... any profits of the infringer that are attributable to the infringement") (emphasis added). Thus, Congress chose to require apportionment under copyright law in 1909, twelve years after deliberately removing the same language from the design patent statute. This is strong evidence that § 289 and § 504 are intentionally different and the courts should not interpret these statutes as requiring the same things.
However, copyright law may still provide the solution to the problem of apportionment in design patent cases. The Copyright Act expressly provides for infringer's profits as a remedy for copyright infringement and expressly requires that such profits be apportioned. However, courts have uniformly interpreted § 504 as requiring a threshold showing by the plaintiff that there is a nexus between the infringer's gross profits and the infringement. See, e.g. Polar Bear Productions, Inc. v. Timex Corp., 384 F.3d 700, 711 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Thus, a copyright owner is required to do more initially than toss up an undifferentiated gross revenue number; the revenue stream must bear a legally significant relationship to the infringement.”); Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 522 (4th Cir. 2003) (“In sum, we conclude that the Defendants could properly be awarded summary judgment...if...there exists no conceivable connection between the infringement and those revenues....”); On Davis v. The Gap, 246 F.3d 152, 160 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[W]e think the term ‘gross revenue’ under the statute means gross revenue reasonably related to the infringement, not unrelated revenues.”); Taylor v. Meirick, 712 F.2d 1112, 1122 (7th Cir. 1983) (“It was not enough to show [Defendant]’s gross revenues from the sale of everything he sold....”). Indeed, the Federal Circuit, itself, has already applied this rule of law in the copyright context. See The University of Colorado Foundation, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 196 F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("The University's argument presumes that the sales of reformulated Materna were due to Cyanamid's copyright infringement. The University had the burden to show this connection.").
The nexus requirement in copyright law is a judicially created, threshold requirement before the infringer's profits become available at all. It has nothing to do with the statutory apportionment required under § 504 if disgorgement is found to be an appropriate remedy. See Andreas v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 336 F.3d 789, 796 (8th Cir. 2003) (“burden of establishing that profits are attributable to the infringed work often gets confused with the burden of apportioning profits between various factors contributing to the profits”) (emphasis added). Under copyright law, where the gross profits do not bear "a legally significant relationship to the infringement," the disgorgement remedy is unavailable and apportionment is simply irrelevant.
There is no good reason why § 289 should not be interpreted as requiring this same threshold showing that the total profits bear "a legally significant relationship to the infringement." Such an interpretation of § 289 would not impinge on Congress' clear intent that profits not be apportioned under § 289 and would honor the equitable roots of the disgorgement remedy for both design patent infringement and copyright infringement. Under § 289, upon a threshold showing of a "a legally significant relationship to the infringement," a design patent infringer would be liable to the extent of their total profits, whereas under § 504, the court would then be required to apportion the infringer's profits. When "a legally significant relationship" between the design patent infringement and the profits cannot be proved, the patent would still be permitted to recover their damages pursuant to § 284.
This interpretation of § 289 would also address the inequitable scenarios cited by Professor Lemley in the Amicus Brief, without improperly re-interpreting § 289 to include the same apportionment requirement that Congress has already deleted. See Amicus Brief at 12 ("If United Airlines uses a patented part in one of its planes, the patent owner cannot simply point to that infringement and say, “Now I am entitled to the entire profit from all aspects of United Airlines.”). Under this scenario, the patentee would likely be unable to show "a legally significant relationship" between United Airline's gross profits and its infringement of a single patented part and disgorgement would not be available as a remedy at all. Samsung's infringement of Apple's Iphone design patents, however, presents a somewhat closer question as to whether there is a threshold nexus between the infringing design and Samsung's gross profits.
This interpretation of § 289 would also address the inequitable scenarios cited by Professor Lemley in the Amicus Brief, without improperly re-interpreting § 289 to include the same apportionment requirement that Congress has already deleted. See Amicus Brief at 12 ("If United Airlines uses a patented part in one of its planes, the patent owner cannot simply point to that infringement and say, “Now I am entitled to the entire profit from all aspects of United Airlines.”). Under this scenario, the patentee would likely be unable to show "a legally significant relationship" between United Airline's gross profits and its infringement of a single patented part and disgorgement would not be available as a remedy at all. Samsung's infringement of Apple's Iphone design patents, however, presents a somewhat closer question as to whether there is a threshold nexus between the infringing design and Samsung's gross profits.
Interpreting § 289 to require a threshold showing of a nexus between the patented design and the infringer's profits would honor the equitable roots of the disgorgement remedy and bring the interpretation of § 289 in line with its equitable cousin, § 504 of the Copyright Act. This proposed interpretation would also address the sometimes inequitable result of awarding "total profits," where those profits are not reasonably related to the infringing design. While apportionment should not be permitted in design patent cases, in accordance with congressional intent, the Federal Circuit should use this opportunity to allow for this basic equitable consideration in design patent cases, as a threshold issue.
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Thursday, January 9, 2014
Federal Circuit Alert: Pacific Coast Marine Windshields Ltd. v. Malibu Boats, LLC
Today brings us our first major Federal Circuit design patent decision of 2014. In a case of first impression, the Federal Circuit held yesterday that the principles of prosecution history estoppel apply to design patents. Pacific Coast Marine Windshields Ltd. v. Malibu Boats, LLC, No. 2013-1199, 2014 WL 53904 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 8, 2014). However, the court reversed the district court’s summary judgment of non-infringement because the accused infringing design was not within the scope of the subject matter surrendered during prosecution, and therefore remanded for further proceedings.
You may recall that we previously discussed the district court’s decision in Pacific Coast Marine Windshields late in 2012. At the time, we predicted that prosecution history estoppel would become a valuable tool for defendants involved in design patent infringement litigation. In view of the Federal Circuit opinion, however, defendants will have a more difficult time showing that the accused design falls within the scope of the surrendered territory and is therefore immune to a patent holder’s assertion that the accused design is a colorable imitation of the claimed design.
The background for the case is
discussed more thoroughly in our earlier post on the district court decision.
Briefly, Pacific Coast accused Malibu Boats of infringing U.S. Design Patent
No. 555,070 for a “Marine Windshield.” A
figure from the ‘070 Patent appears below alongside an image of the accused
Malibu product:
While the two designs share many similarities, they differ
in that the ’070 Patent shows four circular vents at the corner, while the
accused device shows three rectangular ones. Of course, as courts have long
recognized, for a design patent to be infringed it is not necessary that the
accused device reproduce all elements of the patented design, since under such a
standard infringement would never be found. Instead, “any colorable imitation” of
the design will also be found to infringe. See
35 U.S.C. § 289.
However, during prosecution of
the ‘070 Patent, the applicant canceled a number of figures in response to a restriction
requirement from the examiner, including a two-hole embodiment shown below.
The district court ruled that,
under a theory of prosecution history estoppel, the accused Malibu windshield
fell within the territory surrendered during the prosecution of the ‘070 Patent
and therefore Pacific Coast was estopped from asserting that the accused device
was a “colorable imitation” of its patented design.
The Federal Circuit notes that
the concept of “colorable imitation” for design patents is analogous to the doctrine
of equivalents for utility patents. Therefore, prosecution history estoppel,
which limits the availability of the doctrine of equivalents for a party
asserting a utility patent, also limits the availability of infringement under
the theory of “colorable imitation” in a design patent context.
Having concluded that prosecution
history estoppel applies to design patents, the court gives us a glimpse into
the analysis that must then take place in a design patent context to determine
whether a plaintiff is estopped from asserting that the defendant’s design is a
colorable imitation.
Whether prosecution history estoppel bars the infringement
claim turns on the answers to three questions:
- Whether there was a surrender;
- Whether it was for reasons of patentability; and
- Whether the accused design is within the scope of the surrender.
Applying these three questions to
the case at hand, the court answered the first and second in the affirmative,
but reversed the district court by finding that the accused design was not
within the scope of surrender.
In finding that there was a
surrender, the court noted that here, in response to the examiner’s restriction
requirement, the applicant amended the claim by canceling figures associated
with all but one of the patentably distinct groups of designs identified by the
examiner – the four-hole embodiment – and striking references to alternate
configurations from the text. It did not matter that the surrender involved cancelation
rather than amendment. By removing broad claim language referring to alternate
configurations and canceling the individual figures showing the unelected
embodiments, the applicant narrowed the scope of its original application, and
surrendered subject matter.
In finding that this surrender was
for reasons of patentability, the court noted that this element will be
satisfied whenever an amendment is made to secure a patent. The narrowing
amendment need not be to avoid prior art, but a narrowing amendment made to
satisfy any requirement of the Patent
Act may give rise to an estoppel. In the design patent context, a surrender
resulting from a restriction requirement invokes prosecution history estoppel
if the surrender was necessary to secure the patent.
As to the third question, the
court rejected the defendant’s assertion that the accused design was within the
scope of surrender. The defendant’s theory was that in patenting a four-hole
design while canceling the two-hole design, the patent holder surrendered the
range of territory between the canceled design and the patented design, namely
a design with three holes, such as the accused windshield.
The Federal Circuit rejected this
argument, however, noting that while an amendment to a value in a utility
patent claim surrenders the entire range between the original and amended
value, the range theory is not applicable in the context of design patents
where ranges are not claimed, but rather individual designs. Claiming different designs does not
necessarily suggest that the territory between those designs is also claimed.
The applicant surrendered the claimed design with two holes on the windshield
corner post, but neither submitted nor surrendered any three-hole design.
Notably, having rejected the
defendant’s range theory for determining the extent of the surrendered scope,
the court fails to definitively replace it. One obvious candidate for measuring
the scope of surrendered territory would be to define that scope as all
colorable imitations of the canceled design figure. The court notes this
alternative but did not yet accept it. The court reasoned that they need not
decide, in this case, whether the scope of the surrender is measured by the
colorable imitation standard because it was not necessary to resolve the case.
After all, the patent holder never asserted that the accused device was a
colorable imitation of the two-hole design, and the defendant positively
disclaimed that the two-hole embodiment was a colorable imitation of its
accused design.
So where are we left as a result
of this case? We now know that the theory of prosecution history estoppel
applies to design patents as a limit to the colorable imitation standard. We
also know that cancelation of figures in response to a restriction requirement
triggers prosecution history estoppel because it constitutes a surrender of
territory for reasons of patentability. Moreover, we know that the range theory
from utility patents for determining the scope of surrender does not apply to
design patents. Finally, we have a strong hint from the Federal Circuit that
the scope of surrender will extend to all colorable imitations of the canceled
figure, yet no final determination on that matter.
As a result, design patent applicants must be more careful in handling prosecution to avoid being subject to
prosecution history estoppel. Meanwhile, defendants will have to be more
persuasive in showing that their accused device falls within the surrendered
territory.
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Wednesday, November 20, 2013
Apple v. Samsung – Part III: Shouldn’t a Different Set of Rules Apply to Design Patent Injunctions?
Apple v. Samsung is truly the design patent case that keeps on giving, and Monday’s Federal Circuit decision is no different. This time, Apple asked the Court to review Judge Koh’s decision denying Apple’s request for a permanent injunction against future infringement of Apple’s patents. In a unanimous decision, Judges Prost, Bryson, and O’Malley affirmed the district court’s decision with respect to Apple’s design patents, but vacated and remanded for further consideration with respect to Apple’s utility patents. Essentially, the Federal Circuit found that there was no evidence of a “causal nexus” between Samsung’s infringement of Apple’s design patents and Apple’s established loss of market share to Samsung. See Apple v. Samsung III, at 12 (“If the patented feature does not drive the demand for the product, sales would be lost even if the offending feature were absent from the accused product. Thus, a likelihood of irreparable harm cannot be shown if sales would be lost regardless of the infringing conduct.”). According to the Court, Apple's loss of market share may have occurred because of several unrelated and perfectly legal reasons having nothing to do with Apple’s design patents. As such, the court reasoned that irreparable harm could not be shown as a result of future infringement by Samsung. According to the Federal Circuit, the causal nexus requirement “reflects general tort principles of causation.” Id. at 13 (emphasis added).
However, Apple v. Samsung III may be more noteworthy for what it failed to discuss. For example, it is unclear whether the “causal nexus” requirement makes sense in the context of design patents, where Apple already has an equitable remedy for disgorgement of Samsung’s illicit profits for any ongoing or future design patent infringement. In reality, Apple already has a de facto injunction against further infringement by Samsung because it would be entitled to recoup all of Samsung’s profits for any such design patent infringement, even without proving any actual harm or damage to Apple. Yet, the Federal Circuit never addressed this significant difference between utility and design patents in Apple III. Indeed, the disgorgement remedy for design patent infringement is an exception to the very “tort principles of causation” referenced by the court.
In the author’s opinion, the built-in equitable remedy for disgorgement of profits from design patent infringement should impact the permanent injunction analysis for design patents. The equitable remedy of disgorgement exists because Congress has determined that harm and causation should be presumed when a party infringes a design patent. This equitable principal of design patent law should inform the court’s analysis when considering a permanent injunction against further design patent infringement.
Apple does not appear to have argued that design patents should not be subject to a causal nexus requirement because of the unique disgorgement remedy for design patent infringement. However, the court made one statement that offered a glimpse into its possible position on this line of reasoning. Apple argued that the “causal nexus” requirement should only apply to a motion for a preliminary injunction so as not to vitiate a patent owner’s right to exclude others from practicing the patent. In response the Federal Circuit quoted the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay, reasoning that “the creation of a right is distinct from the provision of remedies for violations of that right.” Id. at 17 (eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006)). However, this admonishment does not explain the failure to address the impact of the disgorgement remedy on the injunction analysis. Presumably, the creation of an equitable remedy, such as disgorgement, would be highly relevant to the application of another equitable remedy for the same violation, such as an injunction.
Just add this to the growing list of questions for Apple and Samsung’s attorneys during this week’s design patent conference at Suffolk University School of Law.
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Friday, April 12, 2013
Advanced Design Patenting Techniques – Part I
The days of treating design patent applications as
unsophisticated and easily drafted alternatives to utility applications may be
at an end. More and more patent practitioners
are recognizing the power of design patent applications and particularly how
mastering advanced design patent techniques can provide broader
protection. If you have any reservations
about using such advanced techniques, let us assure you that design patent
giants the likes of Apple and Google have been doing it for years and with
great success. We outline a number of
advanced techniques using granted patents from these heavy weights.
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Wednesday, March 27, 2013
Federal Circuit Alert - In re Owens
On
Tuesday, the Federal Circuit issued a precedential design patent decision with
major implications for the written description requirement for design patents in the case of In re Owens, No. 2012-1261, --- F.3d
--- (Fed. Cir. March 26, 2013). In re Owens was an appeal from a final
rejection for a design application on what appears to be a mouthwash bottle
designed by Procter & Gamble (“P&G”).
On Dec. 21, 2004, P&G filed design patent application No. 29/219,709
(“the ’709 application”), which claimed the bottle as shown on the left,
below. On Nov. 7, 2006, the ’709
application issued as U.S. Design Patent No. 531,515. On February 2, 2006, P&G also filed U.S.
design patent Application No. 29/253,172 (“the ’172 application”). The ‘172 application claimed priority to the
‘709 application, and claimed the bottle as shown in the center, below.
P&G
conceded to the PTO that the design of the ‘172 application had been on sale
for more than a year before the application date and that without a valid
priority claim to the ‘709 application, the ’172 would be obviated by prior
sales. Unfortunately for P&G, the
Examiner rejected the ‘172 application, finding that the new, dashed horizontal
line in the ‘172 application defined an entirely new trapezoidal shape which he
considered new matter, not within the disclosure of the ‘709 application, as
shown on the right, below. “As such, the
examiner rejected the ’172 application for lack of written description under 35
U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1, and furthermore rejected the application as unpatentably
obvious in view of the earlier-sold bottles under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).” The Board affirmed the rejection, finding
that P&G “had claimed previously undisclosed ‘trapezoidal sections
occupying part, but not all, of the
surface area of the front and back panels.’”
On
appeal, the Federal Circuit panel, which included judges Prost, Moore, and
Wallach, stated that “[t]he test for sufficiency of the written description,
which is the same for either a design or a utility patent, has been expressed
as ‘whether the disclosure of the application relied upon reasonably conveys to
those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date.
… Thus, when an issue of priority arises under § 120 in the context of design
patent prosecution, one looks to the drawings of the earlier application for
disclosure of the subject matter claimed in the later application.” (internal
citations omitted).
Both the P&G and the PTO agreed on appeal
that “a design patentee may, under certain circumstances, introduce
via amendment a straight broken line
without adding new matter, even ‘[w]here no [corresponding] boundary line is
shown in a design application as originally filed.’” (citing MPEP § 1503.02)
(alterations in original). P&G
argued that the unclaimed, horizontal line it introduced in the ‘172
application did not introduce a new trapezoidal shape, but merely claimed only
the upper portion of the design of the ‘709 application, citing In re Daniels, 144 F.3d 1452, (Fed. Cir.1998). The patentee of Daniels removed an entire floral design element from a prior
design application for a container (a “leecher”), as shown below.
There, the Federal Circuit held that “Mr. Daniels is entitled to the parent application's filing date for the subject matter of the continuation, thus obviating the rejection based on the intervening publication.” The court reasoned:
The
leecher as an article of manufacture is clearly visible in the earlier design
application, demonstrating to the artisan viewing that application that Mr.
Daniels had possession at that time of the later claimed design of that
article. The leaf ornamentation did not obscure the design of the leecher, all
details of which are visible in the drawings of the earlier application. The
leaf design is a mere indicium that does not override the underlying design.
The subject matter of the later application is common to that of the earlier
application. In the context of 35
U.S.C. § 171 (“design for an article of manufacture” is the subject matter
of a design patent), it is apparent that the earlier application contains a
description of what is claimed in the later application.
In re Daniels at 1456-1457 (internal
citations omitted)
But
the Federal Circuit panel distinguished Daniels,
reasoning that there, the original application disclosed a bottle that one of
skill would recognize as patentable, even if the floral design was
removed. The panel further reasoned that
“the question for written description purposes is whether a skilled artisan
would recognize upon reading the parent’s disclosure that the trapezoidal top portion
of the front panel might be claimed
separately from the remainder of that
area.” (citing Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351.).
Thus, for purposes of design applications, it appears as though the
written description requirement would now include an element of foreseeability.
The
difficulty with In re Owens is that
the ’709 application appears to disclose at least one embodiment of the ‘172
application. For instance, if the ‘172
application were allowed, the design of the ‘709 application would appear to be
within its scope. Intuitively,
practitioners seem to expect that the disclosure of one embodiment of an
invention should be sufficient to support a broader claim. However, the Federal Circuit’s citation of Ariad, although not discussed, appears
to be apt. There, the Federal Circuit
held that the disclosure of a single embodiment was insufficient to support the
written description of a claim with “far broader” scope:
Whatever
thin thread of support a jury might find in the decoy-molecule hypothetical
simply cannot bear the weight of the vast scope of these generic claims. See LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping,
Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed.Cir.2005) (holding that "[a]fter
reading the patent, a person of skill in the art would not understand" the
patentee to have invented a generic method where the patent only disclosed one
embodiment of it); Reiffin, 214 F.3d
at 1345-46 (noting that the "scope of the right to exclude" must not
"overreach the scope of the inventor's contribution to the field of art as
described in the patent specification"); … Here, the specification at best describes decoy molecule
structures and hypothesizes with no accompanying description that they could be
used to reduce NF-kB activity. Yet the asserted claims are far broader. We
therefore conclude that the jury lacked substantial evidence for its verdict
that the asserted claims were supported by adequate written description, and
thus hold the asserted claims invalid.
Thus,
after In re Owens, if a designer of
skill in the art would not reasonably have foreseen the subject matter claimed
by a continuation application, the claims may not be supported by the written
description of the parent. Based on this
interpretation of the law, it is likely that the written description
requirement will become a more robust doctrine in design patent law, and a
major weapon to design patent defendants.
It will be interesting to see whether the Federal Circuit reviews this
decision en banc.
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