Upcoming ABA Roundtable - Design Patent and Trade Dress Litigation: More than Meets the Eye

As 2014 comes to a close, we wanted to make design patent practitioners and enthusiasts aware of an important upcoming ABA webinar regarding design patent litigation.  The webinar, titled Design Patent and Trade Dress Litigation: More than Meets the Eye, will take place on January 21, 2015 from 1:00 E.T. - 2:00 E.T.  The webinar is free and is being presented by the ABA Intellectual Property Litigation Committee.  The speaker will be Christopher V. Carani, a recent guest blogger for the Ordinary Observer.  Participants may register using the above hyperlink. 

This promises to be an important and valuable webinar for any practitioner who is currently or may ever be involved in a design patent litigation.  In my experience, attorneys tend to underestimate the nuanced style of litigation that is required in a design patent case.  Applying the techniques and themes learned from utility patent litigation will often lead to undesirable results.  Many attorneys have learned, through trial and error (literally), that design patent litigation is a very different animal.  Even seasoned utility patent litigators will benefit from a overview of the tactical distinctions between utility patent litigation and design patent litigation, which is becoming a more important tool in the intellectual property arsenal of many of our clients.  

Here is the program description from the ABA website:

Design Patent and Trade Dress Litigation: More than Meets the Eye:

From the design houses of New York City, to the storied industrial design firms of 

Chicago, to the cutting-edge think tanks of Silicon Valley, the desire for effective and enforceable design protection is at an all-time high. Simply put, looks matter. Recently released statistics show that applicants are securing U.S. design patents at record rates. With more design patents issued, there also has been a marked uptick in design patent litigation filings. While design patents share much in common with utility patents and trade dress, they have significant and distinct differences from those rights, which if not understood, can present unique traps for the unwary when it comes to litigation. In this CLE, leading Design IP attorney Christopher V. Carani will discuss design patent-specific litigation issues, including best practices for asserting, and defending against, claims of design patent infringement, the design patent infringement standard, design patent claim construction, the ins and outs of design patent drawings, design patent defenses of prosecution history estoppel, anticipation, obviousness, indefiniteness. Along the way, Mr. Carani also will offer insights and strategies for cases involving both trade dress and design patent infringement claims. 

Speaker: Christopher V. Carani is a partner at the Chicago-based intellectual property law firm of McAndrews, Held & Malloy, Ltd. For over 15 years, Chris has been a leading voice in the field of Design IP, which regards the intersection of design rights, trade dress and copyright law.  Chris counsels clients on strategic design enforcement and protection issues; he is often called upon to render infringement, validity and design-around opinions and serve as a legal consultant/expert in Design IP cases.  Carani has extensive experience litigating Design IP cases.

Apple v. Samsung Oral Arguments, Part I - Functionality and Markman

If you haven't had time to listen to the Federal Circuit arguments in the Apple v. Samsung case last week, don't worry.  The Ordinary Observer has you covered.  We will be examining the arguments in two parts.  Part I will take a look at the functionality discussion that dominated the hearing.  Part II will examine the arguments relating to apportionment.

Samsung began its presentation last Thursday by focusing on functionality, in the context of design patent infringement, and whether the district court was justified in providing the following jury instruction:

If you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the overall appearance of an accused Samsung design is substantially the same as the overall appearance of the claimed Apple design patent, and that the accused design was made, used, sold, offered for sale, or imported within the United States, you must find that the accused design infringed the claimed design.

Samsung complains that Judge Koh failed to "filter out" the allegedly functional elements of Apple's design patents for the jury and failed to offer a jury instruction directing the jury's attention to the "ornamental" aspects of the claim as opposed to the "overall appearance of the claimed Apple design patent":

Kathleen Sullivan (counsel for Samsung): ... As given, the infringement instruction ... instructs the jury to compare the overall appearance of the Samsung and Apple Designs.  Your Honor, crucially, what's missing there is the word "ornamental." You're right that earlier in the invalidity instructions she refers to the term "ornamental."  But the invalidity instructions can't cure the problem with the infringement innstruction.  ... Your honor, we're not saying that there should have been exact, magic words.  We gave her multiple choices, we said "please define the difference between functional and ornamental."  We said "please district court, take out these few things that Apple has admitted are functional..."  As Egyptian Goddess says, the district court has discretion how to distinguish functional from ornamental, but it does not have discretion whether to distinguish functional from ornamental... 

The Court:  What do we do about about the case law that says that your'e supposed to look at the overall design and you're not supposed to just take ornamental features in isolation? 

Sullivan: Your Honor, what you do is say "overall ornamental appearance."  The crucial problem here is that the jury was not instructed to, nor was there any claim construction limiting it to comparing the overall ornamental appearance. 

The problem with Samsung's argument is that it urges the court to turn the question of functionality, for purposes of infringement (i.e. claim construction), over to the jury.  Obviously, that approach would conflict with the Supreme Court's Markman decision, holding that claim construction is exclusively the province of the court and cannot be handed over to the jury.  

As a reminder, functionality can come up in design patent litigation in two contexts: invalidity and infringement.  In the invalidity context, the question for the jury is whether the design is functional as opposed to ornamental.  If the design is dictated solely by function, as opposed to ornamentation, it is invalid for failing to meet the ornamental requirement of § 171.  In the infringement context, courts sometimes seek to "filter out" functional aspects of the claim as a matter of claim construction.  See, e.g., Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc., 597 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2010).  While some have questioned the wisdom of this approach as improperly dissecting the claim, it remains a contentious issue in design patent law. 

Samsung argues that Judge Koh's instructions were improper because they failed to instruct the jury to consider only the ornamental aspects of the claim and failed to "define the difference between functional and ornamental" in the infringement context.  But such an instruction would have been tantamount to charging the jury with claim construction - here, selecting which design elements were functional and filtering them out of the claim.  In the utility patent context this would be like reading the Phillips case to a jury and then instructing them to evaluate infringement "applying the proper claim scope."  That would be reversible error.

If there was any error in the jury charge, it would have been in Judge Koh's decision not to construe the functional limitations of the claim, at all.  To the extent functionality was really at issue in the infringement context, it was Judge Koh's job to construe the patent, not he jury's.

The Federal Circuit has given conflicting guidance on a trial court's "discretion" in construing "functional and non-functional elements."  In Egyptian Goddess, a case we have addressed several times, the court stated that "where a design contains both functional and non-functional elements, the scope of the claim must be construed in order to identify the non-functional aspects of the design as shown in the patent."  Yet, in the next paragraph, the court also said "[w]e therefore leave the question of verbal characterization of the claimed designs to the discretion of trial judges..."  It is curious that Judge Koh would send the question of design patent functionality (in the validity context) to the jury but simultaneously decline to construe any functional elements of the claim.  If there was a question of material fact as to whether any of the design patents were functional, as a whole, isn't there necessarily a question of fact as to whether individual design elements are functional?

The answer may come down to the extent of Judge Koh's discretion in construing the design patent (or not). Trial judges may have discretion to determine whether the functional limitations, if present, would improperly impact the jury's consideration of the overall ornamental design.  For example, with utility patents, judges are not obliged to construe every conceivably disputed claim term and always have some level of discretion. See U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 103 F. 3d 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("Claim construction is ... to clarify and when necessary to explain what the patentee covered by the claims, for use in the determination of infringement. It is not an obligatory exercise in redundancy.").  Judge Koh likely used her discretion to decline to spell out what was ornamental vs. what was functional for the jury if she believed that the allegedly functional elements of the design would not meaningfully impact the jury's determination of infringement.

The Federal Circuit has an opportunity to clarify a district court's discretion in construing a design patent to "filter out" functional limitations.  As with any claim construction issue, district courts ought to be allowed some independence in determining when design patent claim construction is "necessary" or would otherwise be more helpful than harmful for the trier of fact.  This should include the discretion to decline to construe the design at all, even when functionality is at issue in the validity context. 

Chris Carani on Functionality - A Sensible Solution

Design patent all-star Chris Carani recently published a comprehensive review of the functionality issue in design patent law.  The article, titled Design Patent Functionality: A Sensible Solution, has been published in the ABA Section of Intellectual Property Law's periodical, Landslide, and argues for a balanced approach to the functionality issue that honors the statutory requirement for "ornamental" designs under Section 171 of the Patent Act.  You can read the full article here.  With Mr. Carani's blessing, we've highlighted some of the key points, below.

Mr. Carani explains how the functionality doctrine has been expanded in recent years, in part due to a relatively straightforward Federal Circuit decision in 1998 holding that design patents protect designs and do not provide protection for general concepts.  See Lee v. Dayton-Hudson (1998).  We have echoed this same caution here on this blog several times.  The article argues that the modern perspective on functionality has sprung out of a misapplication of this fundamental truth about design patents, but that the functionality doctrine ought to be confined to a inquiry about subject matter eligibility, and should not expand into a piece-by-piece dissection of design patent claims. 

Mr. Carani uses a charming graphic to illustrate his point:

Some courts have interpreted the functionality doctrine to require that any functional elements within the claim be "filtered out" of the claim as part of claim construction or jury instructions.  In the example above, a court might arguably "construe" the key in Example B as having no claim regarding the design of the actual key mechanism.  In other words, the court might construe Example B to be identical to Example A, based on functionality.  However, the statute suggests that the functionality doctrine may be more akin to a subject matter eligibility test, asking whether the claimed design, as a whole, is ornamental or dictated solely by the function of the article.  For example, the design claimed in Example C is arguably dictated by the function of the key (i.e. fitting a lock).  See See Best Lock Corp. v. Ilco Unican Corp., 40 USPQ2d 1048 (Fed. Cir. 1996).  As such, the claim of Example C, as a whole, may be dictated by function and therefore ineligible for design patent protection, whereas Example B, as a whole, is likely eligible.

Mr. Carani argues in favor applying functionality as suggested by the statute and resisting the urge to "filter out" functional limitations within a design patent claim.  The PTAB may be signaling its agreement with this suggested approach in its recent IPR decisions, as we have previously noted. 

Mr. Carani has offered a comprehensive examination of the historical underpinnings of the functionality doctrine and its proper role within modern design patent jurisprudence.  His article is particularly timely as some courts have begun to suggest that there may be some linkage between the functionality doctrine in design patent law and in trademark law, which are distinct doctrines serving different public policy goals. 

Chris Carani will be leading a discussion on the topic of functionality during the next ABA Design Committee conference call on December 16. 

Judge Robinson Reverses on "Normal Intended Use"

Back in August, we reported on a decision from Judge Robinson on the issue of how to define the "ordinary observer," in the case of Poly America, L.P. v. API Indus., Inc..  This case concerns a design for a box for holding and dispensing household trash bags.  As part of that decision on API's unsuccessful motion for judgment on the pleadings, Judge Robinson also addressed whether the internal flaps of the accused cardboard box could be a distinguishing feature of the accused design.  Judge Robinson concluded that the internal flaps could not be a distinguishing feature of the accused design because they would not be visible during the normal, intended use of the accused product.  

As I interpret the above in the context of this case, I come to several conclusions. In the first instance, the "normal use" of the product at issue- a box containing plastic trash bags - extends well beyond the stage of manufacturing (where API would place the hypothetical purchaser) and retail sale to the homes of the retail consumers who open the boxes to use the bags. In this regard, the flaps depicted in figures 8-10 of the '719 patent are not visible at any time during the normal use of the product. Rather than support API's position, then, I conclude that the analysis in Contessa confirms my initial analysis.

Order Denying Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings at 6-7, available here (emphasis added).  Judge Robinson's August decision left little doubt that the internal flaps of the design patent at issue had been construed as immaterial to the question of infringement, as a matter of law.   While some questioned the correctness of that decision (see comment section of our original post), it became the law of the case back in August.

As a reminder, below are the figures from the design patent-in-suit and the accused box:

Poly-America was no doubt surprised, therefore, when Judge Robinson granted summary judgement of no-infringement to API last Tuesday, citing the differences in this same exact feature of the accused product. Only three months after holding that the internal flaps of the cardboard box were irrelevant to the infringement question, Judge Robinson held on summary judgment that the differences in this aspect of the box, alone, precluded a finding of infringement. Essentially, the Court held that it had overlooked recycling as part of the normal, intended use of the product:

In this regard, API presented expert testimony that, regardless of what an ordinary observer would see at the time of purchase, an ordinary observer would view the even top flaps, tabs and slots of the patented design "upon opening the box from the top or flattening it for recycling." ... Although Poly questioned the frequency with which an ordinary observer would view these features, it was unable to point to any evidence that would contradict APl's contention that the flaps, tabs and slots are visible at the point of disassembly, or that recycling was part of a box's "normal use." ... Because Poly failed to identify a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the "normal use" of the box at issue, the court considers the flaps, tabs and slots as part of the overall design for purposes of its infringement analysis.

Order Granting Summary Judgment at 15, available here (emphasis added). 

While Judge Robinson's reversal may seem unfair to Poly America, it is probably the correct conclusion in this case.  API's arguments at the pleadings stage appears to have focused on the visible aspects of the accused design during the manufacturing process, not the normal, intended use of the ultimate consumer.  Had API made its "recycling" argument a bit sooner, API may have been able to resolve this case back in August based on the same argument.  

Poly America is a reminder that it is important for design patent litigants to take a broad view of the normal, intended uses for a given article.  The normal, intended use of a product may encompass any aspect of the products' everyday use, including recycling, washing, drying, wearing, cleaning, opening, closing, or any other customary situation for the product during its life.  Issues of infringement and validity can only be properly decided with a broad perspective on how the design will be encountered in the "real world," and not just within the figures of a design patent.  

Reddy v. Lowe’s Companies, Inc. – “As Shown and Described” means “As Shown”

In December, 2013, the Ordinary Observer initially reported on Reddy v. Lowe's Companies, Inc., (1:13-cv-13016), a case filed in the District of Massachusetts on November 25, 2013, concerning U.S. Design Patent No D677,423.  This week, Judge Young issued a memorandum in that case construing the claim of the D'423 Patent.  Judge Young's construction raises some questions as to the court's treatment of narrative elements of the claimed design which warrant further discussion.

The D'423 Patent is entitled "bathroom vanity light shade."  The left-hand image below shows two figures excerpted from the patent, Figures 1 and 2, which are fairly representative.  The right-hand image is a screen shot of what may be an accused device produced by the Defendants.

The claim of this patent is directed to "[t]he ornamental design for a bathroom vanity light shade, as shown and described."  The Court's present memorandum has little to say about what is shown.  It principally concerns what is described.

The specification of the D'423 Patent includes a brief narrative:

The bathroom vanity light shade is an ornamental fixture consisting of a rectangular, metal rod skeleton, wrapped in fabric on three sides (front side, left side, right side), with a stationary acrylic diffuser bottom. The bathroom vanity light shade mounts on the wall with top/back exposed mounting rod.

Virtually nothing recited in the narrative can be visually seen in the patent figures.  The shading applied to four of the sides indicates those surfaces are intended to be transparent, but there is no visible evidence of the so-called rod skeleton, or specific imagery distinguishing fabric and acrylic sides.

This sort of narrative description is unusual but generally not impermissible.  Patent & Trademark Office regulations state, "No description, other than a reference to the drawing, is ordinarily required."  (37 C.F.R. § 1.153(a)).  "However, while not required, such a description is not prohibited and may be incorporated, at applicant’s option, into the specification or may be provided in a separate paper." (M.P.E.P. § 1503.01).   An examiner can object to the inclusion of descriptive statements which are unclear or inaccurate, but absent a proper objection, the PTO will generally permit an applicant to incorporate descriptive statements into the claim by adding the words "and described" after "shown" in the traditional claim language, “The ornamental design for (the article which embodies the design or to which it is applied) as shown.”  (Id.).  The patent in this case claims "[t]he ornamental design for a bathroom vanity light shade, as shown and described."

Judge Young's approach represents a substantial diversion from PTO practices.  He concludes that design patents operate under a "figure-only" framework, where:

any written description that goes beyond the scope of the figures would be unprotected by the patent, and thus ought not be part of the construed claim.  Thus, the references to "wrapped in fabric" and an "acrylic diffuser bottom," since they are not shown in the figures, would stretch beyond the patent.

Judge Young proposes that regulations allow only "written descriptions that clarify features on an existing drawn figure" and not "written descriptions that add new features not present on the figure."  Because "fabric side" and "acrylic diffuser bottom" may be viewed as added features, Judge Young contends these statements are best viewed as a "preferred embodiment," though he admits, "they probably ought not have been included when the patent was issued."

The defendants also argued that the patentee was estopped from arguing the acrylic diffuser and fabric sides were not limitations on the claims based on statements made by the patentee during the prosecution of the patent.  Judge Young rejected this argument, finding the prosecution history subject to multiple interpretations and therefore not a clear disavowal of claim scope.

Judge Young's construction in this case is difficult to square with PTO regulations allowing descriptive  statements in the specification of design patents to "supplement the drawing disclosure to define the scope of protection sought by the claim."  (M.P.E.P. § 1504.04).  While the Judge correctly places a strong emphasis on the figures as the best description of the claimed invention, effectively ignoring narrative statements in the written description of a design patent is relatively unprecedented.  The court draws a distinction between narrative statements that clarify, such as those that disclaim broken lines appearing in the drawings, and those that add new features, but the line between the two is muddy.  If a patentee may use words to disclaim broken lines, why then, can a patentee not use descriptive statements to disclaim materials which do not form part of the claimed invention (i.e., materials except acrylic and fabric)? 

This is not likely a case where claim construction is effectively determinant.  Judge Young's construction is expressly without prejudice to future jury instructions or other grounds of invalidity and non-enforceability.  Furthermore, while the patentee has obtained a construction which likely help their arguments in favor of infringement, for the purpose of invalidity, the plaintiff faces the prospect of defending as novel and non-obvious a light shade in the shape of a rectangular box having four sides and two open sides.

We will be on the look out for future developments in this case.

Guest Post - In Apportionment Debate, Design Patents Should Be Distinct

Editor's Note:  The below guest post was authored by Brice Beckwith, a law student at Oklahoma University College of Law.  Brice presented at last month's ABA Design Committee meeting on the subject of apportionment and was kind enough to write up his presentation for the Ordinary Observer.  The ABA Design Committee holds monthly meetings (via conference call) where the members discuss current events in design law and noteworthy decisions.  So sign up and join the conversation!

When I began to look through the Apple v. Samsung briefs concerning disgorgement of total profits under § 289 a few weeks ago, it occurred to me that in many ways the briefs illustrate everything I have come to expect from this area of law. The arguments proceed despite a noticeable lack of recent or direct case law, there is admixture of copyright and trademark policy rationales throughout, and (my favorite) a dependence on late 19th century legislative history as applied to modern smartphones. In my view, the characteristics of these arguments lend credence to the belief that the state of design patent law loosely holds shape as some sort of intellectual property hodgepodge. Nowhere is this more apparent than when reading the arguments that make comparisons between design patent law and other intellectual property regimes. For example, many arguments against § 289’s disgorgement of total profits were similar to calls for a causation/nexus requirement between the infringer’s profit and the infringement. By looking at these arguments we can get some idea as to what makes this area so amorphous, and how that may cause a few pitfalls. 

In its Appellant Brief, Samsung argued for a causation requirement for § 289 based on two premises. First, Samsung, as best it could, stayed within the realm of patent law by arguing that patent infringement is essentially a tort, and that as a tort it requires a proof of causation. To make this claim, Samsung needed both a utility patent case, Carbice Corp. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 33 (2002), and a copyright case, Mackie v. Rieser, 296 F.3d 909, 915 (9th Cir. 2002). Later, in its Reply Brief, Samsung clarified that this causation requirement would not violate the Congressional intent to abolish apportionment because the requirement would be separate from and precede any apportionment inquiry. See Samsung Reply Brief at 14.  Second, in its appellant brief, Samsung argued for an interpretation of § 289 that would treat an award of profits as a ceiling and emphasized that a causation requirement may already exist in § 289’s language, which states that a patent holder “shall not twice recover the profit made from the infringement.” Relying on another utility patent case, Samsung attempted to bolster this interpretation by tying a lack of causation requirement to constitutional concerns over inappropriately enlarging the patent monopoly raised in Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 5-6, 86 (1966). 

In some contrast, Professor Mark Lemley’s arguments in “Brief Amici Curiae of 27 Law Professors In Support of Appellant Samsung,” took a different road to the same conclusion. Professor Lemely set up trademark law as a close analogue to design patent law in order to show the court a more familiar route it could take when resolving the disgorgement issue. Among several other trademark rules that were offered, was a trademark requirement that a court could award profits only on sales that were attributable to the infringement. See id. at 7. Although Professor Lemley made this point more in passing, it demonstrates a reality in design law that often advocates must reach beyond design patent law for answers.

In that same vein, in a post written on this blog back in August by William Seymour, we can see a similar argument for a causation/nexus requirement stemming from a third body of law. Whereas Samsung chose patent law, and Professor Lemley looked to trademark, Mr. Seymour provided a solution through Copyright law. From his perspective, the copyright disgorgement remedy found in 17 U.S.C. § 504b offers a better analogue to § 289. After comparing the history of the two statutes, Mr. Seymour came to the conclusion that the differences between the two statutes provides strong evidence that the court should not interpret § 289 to allow apportionment. Despite this, Mr. Seymour offered another out for Samsung by pointing to the judicially created nexus requirement for § 504. Under this nexus test the copyright owner must show a legally significant relationship between the infringer’s gross profits and the infringement. Furthermore, the nexus inquiry acts as a threshold requirement before the disgorgement of the infringer’s profits even comes into question. In many ways this solution mirrors what both Samsung and Professor Lemley offered in their respective briefs, and therefore is yet another example of how, in design patent law, the same destination can be reached by taking different paths. 

Taken as a whole, these arguments echo in practice what many commentators propose in design patent scholarship, which is to replace design patent law (either wholly or partly) with copyright, trademark, or some type of sui generis scheme. There is an argument that the very nature of industrial art dictates that the law governing design patents must exist in a space that blurs the lines between other intellectual property regimes. However, these blurred lines may just as likely not be caused by the nature of the thing being protected, but instead by the, long-standing and recently changing, unpopularity of the law. A risk in substituting legal tools from trademark and copyright law is that any independent purpose that design patents once had may be lost somewhere in the mix. Maybe we forget the very reason that design patents were created as a separate entity and, in that forgetting, the replacement of the design patents with other schemes becomes all that more preferable. 

These arguments may also reveal an implicit unease that exists in allowing design patents to be independent from other intellectual property regimes. When faced with rebutting the proposition of a causation requirement, Apple and its amici struggled to find policy rationales that solely belonged to design patents. For instance, in its Appellee brief, Apple rejected any call for a causation requirement on the premise that causation would violate Congressional intent because it essentially equated to apportionment. However, in doing so, Apple avoided making any policy arguments beyond Congressional intent to justify a remedy as severe as § 289. 

In his amicus brief, Perry Saidman made the very same argument that any question of causation equates to a question of apportionment; however, unlike Apple, Mr. Saidman did offer a justification for § 289. Mr. Saidman claimed that one reason design patents require § 289 is because when an infringer appropriates a design patent they are appropriating the “very face of the company.” Id. at 19. Mr. Saidman further noted that when a design patent is infringed the infringers often take more than just product design, rather the infringers in effect misappropriate the very brand of the patent holder. See id. This concern for the protection of brand demonstrates just how blurry the lines in design patent law can be. It is an argument that design patents are unique and therefore deserve a special tool in § 289, but what makes design patents unique in this case is a shared purpose with unfair competition law. In some ways this argument resembles that of Samsung, Mr. Lemley, and Mr. Seymour because it demonstrates the need to incorporate tools and policy from other intellectual property regimes when an immediate answer is not available. 

With these arguments the Federal Circuit has a chance, through its interpretation of § 289, to add some clarity to the amorphous subject of design law. Although the Court must make a skin deep choice regarding apportionment, the more interesting decision may be whether the Court decides to justify its holding uniquely from a design patent perspective or from some other intellectual property regime.

Prestige Jewelry v. BK Jewelry - Diamond Cuts are Non-Functional

On Monday, Chief Judge Preska of the Southern District of New York handed down a fascinating summary judgment decision in an epic design patent feud between Prestige Jewelry and BK Jewelry.  The decision covers a great deal of design patent law, which Judge Preska navigates quite nicely.  Students and practitioners of design patent law would be wise to read this decision which provides an excellent overview of design patent law, generally.   

There's too much to comment on in this 52-page decision, but I would like to single out the discussion of functionality.  As we've said before on this blog, true functionality arguments are rare in design patent cases, but for some reason design patent defendants keep gravitating towards functionality like a moth to the flame.  This case is another classic example of a functionality argument that probably never should have been raised.  

BK's U.S. Design Patent No. 618,132 covers a diamond arrangement with a relatively larger "full-cut" diamond in the center, surrounded by 9 smaller single cut diamonds:

Those who have been married in the last five years might recognize this design, as the decision suggests it has been wildly popular.  

Prestige's theory of functionality really had more to do with the design process than the design itself.  Apparently, the inventor, Rocky Wong, testified that "he used a 'light box' to conduct 'refraction tests' and determined that, in his opinion, the 'full-cut center stone' surrounded by nine single-cut stones 'looked the best.'"  "Wong also agreed that the ‘132 Patent arrangement 'performed the best' because 'it had the best refraction.'"

While such testimony would clearly be relevant to the question of functionality in the trade dress context, it doesn't have the same bearing on design patent functionality.  Even assuming that the design of the '132 Patent was perfect (i.e. it provided the most potential refraction), the luster of the gem is not a function in the design patent context, it is an aesthetic effect.  All designs are intended to be as pleasing as possible, using the fundamental elements of human perception - color, brightness, texture, shape, etc.  Perfecting the perception of a design is inherently aesthetic, not functional, and Chief Judge Preska correctly granted summary judgment of non-functionality on this basis:

This argument incorrectly blurs the distinction between ornamental and functional designs. Admittedly, Wong sometimes described the design of the ‘132 Patent in language that superficially might suggest a functional design. He admitted that his design “performed the best” and stated that he used a light box to test various arrangements in search of the “best refraction.” (Wong Dep. Tr., at 74:4-9.) But these statements do not change the fact that the ultimate purpose of the ‘132 Patent design is to have a pleasing appearance—a quintessentially ornamental purpose. Simply because an inventor experiments with alternative designs or uses rudimentary tools and tests does not mean the resulting design is functional. Presumably, most designs are developed not on a whim but rather through some process of trial and error—whether by using a light box, consumer surveys, or simply taking a few steps back and squinting at the design from a distance. The relevant inquiry is the nature of the design, not how the design was developed. Here, the design of the ‘132 Patent is unquestionably ornamental—it is cluster of diamonds arranged solely to be pleasing to the eye.

Prestige Jewelry v. BK Jewelry, No. 1:11-cv-02930, at 32-33 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2014).

As Chief Judge Preska reasoned, design patent functionality has nothing to do with a scientific design process.  Functionality depends on whether the article of manufacture has a utilitarian function, and whether the design claimed in the patent is dictated by that utilitarian function.  

There are lots of other great design patent nuggets in Chief Judge Preska's decision, including claim construction, reexamination, obviousness, infringement, and prior art.  It will be interesting to see what happens at the trial in this case.  Non-infringement may depend on how well the jury can distinguish between single-cut and full-cut diamonds so jury selection will be key.  We will keep an eye on this interesting saga, which is drawing to a close, and provide an update after trial.